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Abstract. While abstraction is a classic tool of verification to scale it
up, it is not used very often for verifying neural networks. However, it
can help with the still open task of scaling existing algorithms to state-
of-the-art network architectures. We introduce an abstraction framework
applicable to fully-connected feed-forward neural networks based on clus-
tering of neurons that behave similarly on some inputs. For the particular
case of ReLU, we additionally provide error bounds incurred by the ab-
straction. We show how the abstraction reduces the size of the network,
while preserving its accuracy, and how verification results on the abstract
network can be transferred back to the original network.
1 Introduction
Neural networks (NN) are successfully used to solve many hard problems reason-
ably well in practice. However, there is an increasing desire to use them also in
safety-critical settings, such as perception in autonomous cars [Che+17a], where
reliability has to be on a very high level and that level has to be guaranteed,
preferably by a rigorous proof. This is a great challenge, in particular, since NN
are naturally very susceptible to adversarial attacks, as many works have demon-
strated in the recent years [Pap+16; AM18; Don+18; SVS19].Consequently, var-
ious verification techniques for NN are being developed these days. Most verifi-
cation techniques focus on proving robustness of the neural networks [CNR17;
Ehl17; Hua+17; Kat+17; Geh+18; Sin+19b], i.e. for a classification task, when
the input is perturbed by a small ε, the resulting output should be labeled the
same as the output of the original input. Reliable analysis of robustness is com-
putationally extremely expensive and verification tools struggle to scale when
faced with real-world neural networks [Dvi+18].
Abstraction [CGL94; Cla+00] is one of the very classic techniques used in for-
mal methods to obtain more understanding of a system as well as more efficient
analysis. Disregarding details irrelevant to the checked property allows for con-
structing a smaller system with a similar behaviour. Although abstraction-based
techniques are ubiquitous in verification, improving its scalability, such ideas
have not been really applied to the verification of NN, except for a handful of
works discussed later.
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In this paper, we introduce an abstraction framework for NN. In contrast
to syntactic similarities, such as having similar weights on the edges from the
previous layer [ZYZ18], our aim is to provide a behavioural, semantic notion of
similarity, such as those delivered by predicate abstraction, since such notions are
more general and thus more powerful. Surprisingly, this direction has not been
explored for NN. One of the reasons is that the neurons do not have an explicit
structure like states of a program that are determined by valuations of given
variables. What are actually the values determining neurons in the network?
Note that in many cases, such as recognition of traffic signs or numbers,
there are finitely many (say k) interesting data points on which and on whose
neighbourhood the network should work well. Intuitively, these are the key points
that determine our focus, our scope of interest. Consequently, we propose the
following equivalence on neurons. We evaluate the k inputs, yielding for each
neuron a k-tuple of its activation values. This can be seen as a vector in Rk. We
stipulate that two neurons are similar if they have similar vectors, i.e, very close
to each other. To determine reasonable equivalence classes over the vectors, we
use the machine-learning technique of k-means clustering [HTF09]. While other
techniques, e.g. principal component analysis [Bis06], might also be useful, simple
clustering is computationally cheap and returns reasonable results. To summarize
in other words, in the lack of structural information about the neurons, we use
empirical behavioural information instead.
Applications Once we have a way of determining similar neurons, we can merge
each equivalence class into a single neuron and obtain a smaller, abstracted NN.
There are several uses of such an NN. Firstly, since it is a smaller one, it may
be preferred in practice since, generally, smaller networks are often more robust,
smoother, and obviously less resource-demanding to run [Che+17b]. Note that
there is a large body of work on obtaining smaller NN from larger ones, e.g.
see [Che+17b; Den+20]. Secondly, and more interestingly in the safety-critical
context, we can use the smaller abstract NN to obtain a guaranteed solution
to the original problem (verifying robustness or even other properties) in two
distinct ways:
1. The smaller NN could replace the original one and could be easier to verify,
while doing the same job (more precisely, the results can be ε-different where
we can compute an upper bound on ε from the abstraction).
2. We can analyze the abstract NN more easily as it is smaller and then transfer
the results (proof of correctness or a counterexample) to the original one,
provided the difference ε is small enough.
The latter corresponds to the classic abstraction-based verification scenario. For
each of these points, we provide proof-of-concept experimental evidence of the
method’s potential.
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Our contribution is thus the following:
– We propose to explore the framework of abstraction by clustering based
on experimental data. For feed-forward NN with ReLU, we provide error
bounds.
– We show that the abstraction is also usable for compression. The reduction
rate grows with the size of the original network, while the abstracted NN is
able to achieve almost the same accuracy as the original network.
– We demonstrate the verification potential of the approach: (i) In some cases
where the large NN was not analyzable (within time-out), we verified the
abstraction using existing tools; for other NN, we could reduce verification
times from thousands to hundreds of seconds. (ii) We show how to transfer a
proof of robustness by a verification tool DeepPoly [Sin+19a] on the abstract
NN to a proof on the original network, whenever the clusters do not have
too large radii.
Related work In contrast to compression techniques, our abstraction provides a
mapping between original neurons and abstract neurons, which allows for trans-
ferring the claims of the abstract NN to the original one, and thus its verification.
The very recent work [YGK19] suggests an abstraction, which is based solely
on the sign of the effect of increasing a value in a neuron. While we can demon-
strate our technique on e.g. 784 dimension input (MNIST) and work with gen-
eral networks, [YGK19] is demonstrated only on the Acas Xu [JKO18] networks
which have 5 dimensional input; our approach handles thousands of nodes while
the benchmark used in [YGK19] is of size 300. Besides, we support both clas-
sification and regression networks. Finally, our approach is not affected by the
number of outputs, whereas the [YGK19] grows exponentially with respect to
number of outputs.
[PA19] produces so called Interval Neural Networks containing intervals in-
stead of single weights and performs abstraction by merging these intervals. How-
ever, they do not provide a heuristic for picking the intervals to merge, but pick
randomly. Further, the results are demonstrated only on the low-dimensional
Acas Xu networks.
Further, [SB15] computes a similarity measure between incoming weights and
then starts merging the most similar ones. It also features an analysis of how
many neurons to remove in order to not lose too much accuracy. However, it
does not use clustering on the semantic values of the activations, but only on
the syntactic values of the incoming weights, which is a very local and thus less
powerful criterion. Similarly, [ZYZ18] clusters based on the incoming weights
only and does not bound the error. [HMD16] clusters weights in contrast to our
activation values) using the k-means clustering algorithm. However, the focus
is on weight-sharing and reducing memory consumption, treating neither the
abstraction mapping nor verification.
Finally, abstracting neural networks for verification purposes was first pro-
posed by [PT10], transforming the networks into Boolean constraints.
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2 Preliminaries
We consider simple feedforward neural networks, denoted by D, consisting of
one input layer, one output layer and one or more hidden layers. The layers are
numbered 1, 2, . . . , L with 1 being the input layer, L being the output layer and
2, . . . , L − 1 being the hidden layers. Layer ℓ contains nℓ neurons. A neuron is
a computation unit which takes an input h ∈ R, applies an activation function
φ : R → R on it and gives as output z = φ(h). Common activation functions
include tanh, sigmoid or ReLU [MHN13], however we choose to focus on ReLU
for the sake of simplicity, where ReLU(x) is defined as max(0, x). Neurons of one
layer are connected to neurons of the previous and/or next layers by means of
weighted connections. Associated with every layer ℓ that is not an output layer
is a weight matrix W (ℓ) = (w
(ℓ)
i,j ) ∈ R
nℓ+1×nℓ where w
(ℓ)
i,j gives the weights of the
connections to the ith neuron in layer ℓ+1 from the jth neuron in layer ℓ. We use
the notation W
(ℓ)
i,∗ = [w
(ℓ)
i,1 , . . . , w
(ℓ)
i,nℓ
] to denote the incoming weights of neuron
i in layer ℓ + 1 and W
(ℓ)
∗,j = [w
(ℓ)
1,j , . . . , w
(ℓ)
nℓ+1,j
]⊺ to denote the outgoing weights
of neuron j in layer ℓ. Note that W
(ℓ)
i,∗ and W
(ℓ)
∗,j correspond to the i
th row and
jth column of W (ℓ) respectively. The input and output of a neuron i in layer ℓ
is denoted by h
(ℓ)
i and z
(ℓ)
i respectively. We call h
ℓ = [h
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , h
(ℓ)
nℓ ]
⊺ the vector
of pre-activations of layer ℓ and zℓ = [z
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , z
(ℓ)
nℓ ]
⊺ the vector of activations of
layer ℓ, where z
(ℓ)
i = φ
(ℓ)(h
(ℓ)
i ). A vector b
(ℓ) ∈ Rnℓ called bias is also associated
with all hidden layers ℓ.
In a feedforward neural network, information flows strictly in one direction:
from layer ℓm to layer ℓn where ℓm < ℓn. For an n1-dimensional input x ∈ X
from some input space X ⊆ Rn1 , the output y ∈ RnL of the neural network D,
also written as y = D(x) is iteratively computed as follows:
h(0) = x
h(ℓ+1) =W (ℓ)z(ℓ) + b(ℓ+1) (1)
z(ℓ+1) = φ(h(ℓ+1)) (2)
y = z(L)
where φ(x) is the column vector obtained on applying φ component-wise to x.
We sometimes write z(ℓ)(x) to denote the output of layer ℓ when x is given as
input to the network.
We define a local robustness query to be a tuple Q = (D,x, δ) for some
network D, input x and perturbation δ ∈ R|x| and call D to be robust with
respect to Q if ∀x′ ∈ [x− δ,x+ δ] : D(x′) = D(x). In this paper, we only deal
with local robustness.
3 Abstraction
In classic abstraction, states that are similar with respect to a property of interest
are merged for analysis. In contrast, for NN, it is not immediately clear which
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neurons to merge and what similarity means. Indeed, neurons are not actually
states/configurations of the system; as such, neurons, as opposed to states with
values of variables, do not have inner structure. Consequently, identifying and
dropping irrelevant information (part of the structure) becomes more challenging.
We propose to merge neurons which compute a similar function on some set X
of inputs, i.e., for each input x ∈ X to the network, they compute ε-close values.
We refer to this as I/O-similarity. Further, we choose to merge neurons only
within the same layer to keep the analysis and implementation straightforward.
In Section 3.1, we show a straightforward way to merge neurons in a way
that is sensible if they are I/O-similar. In Section 3.2, we give a heuristic for
partitioning neurons into classes according to their I/O-similarity. While this
abstraction idea is not limited to verification of robustness, it preserves the
robustness of the original network particularly well, as seen in the experiments
in Section 5.
3.1 Merging I/O-similar neurons
I/O-similar neurons can be merged easily without changing the behaviour of the
NN too much. First, we explain the procedure on an example.
1
2
3
4
5
6
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
w8
w9
(a) Original network
1
2
3
4
5
6
w1
w2 w4
w5
w7
w8 + w9
(b) Network after merging neurons 4 and 5
Fig. 1: Before and after merge: neuron 4 is chosen as a representative of both 4
and 5. On merging, the incoming weights of neuron 5 are deleted and its outgoing
weight is added to the outgoing weight of neuron 4.
Example 1. Consider the network shown in Figure 1a. The network contains
2 input neurons and 4 ReLU neurons. For simplicity, we skip the bias term
in this example network. Hence, the activations of the neurons in the middle
layer are given as follows: z3 = ReLU(w1z1 + w4z2), z4 = ReLU(w2z1 + w5z2),
z5 = ReLU(w3z1+w6z2); and the output of neuron 6 is z6 = ReLU(w7z3+w8z4+
w9z5). Suppose that for all inputs in the dataset, the activations of neurons 4 and
5 are ‘very’ close, denoted by z4 ≈ z5. Then, z6 = ReLU(w7z3 + w8z4 + w9z5).
Since neurons 4 and 5 behave similarly, we abstract the network by merging
the two neurons as shown in Figure 1b. Here, neuron 4 is chosen as a representa-
tive of the “cluster” containing neurons 4 and 5, and the outgoing weight of the
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Algorithm 1 Abstract network D with given clustering KL
1: procedure Abstract(D,X,KL)
2: D˜ ← D
3: for ℓ← 2, . . . , L − 1 do
4: A← {a
(ℓ)
i | a
(ℓ)
i = [z˜
(ℓ)
i (x1), . . . , z˜
(ℓ)
i (xN)] where xi ∈ X}
5: C ← kmeans(A,KL(ℓ))
6: for C ∈ C do
7: W˜
(ℓ)
∗,rep(C)
←
∑
i∈C
W
(ℓ)
∗,i
8: delete C \ {rep(C)} from D˜
return D˜
representative is set to the sum of outgoing weights of all the neurons in the clus-
ter. Note that the incoming weights of the representative do not change. In the
abstracted network, the activations of the neurons in the middle layer are now
given by z˜3 = ReLU(w1z˜1+w4z˜2) = z3 and z˜4 = ReLU(w2z˜1+w5z˜2) = z4 with
neuron 5 being removed. The output of neuron 6 is therefore z˜6 = ReLU(w7z˜3+
(w8 + w9)z˜4) = ReLU(w7z3 + (w8 + w9)z4) = ReLU(w7z3 + w8z4 + w9z4) ≈ z6,
which illustrates that merging preserves the behaviour of the network.
Formally, the process of merging two neurons p and q belonging to the same
layer ℓ works as follows. We assume, without loss of generality, that p is retained
as the representative. First, the abstract network D˜ is set to the original network
D. Next, W˜ (ℓ−1) is set to W (ℓ−1) with the qth row deleted. Further, we set the
outgoing weights of the representative p to the sum of outgoing weights of p and q,
W˜
(ℓ)
∗,p =W
(ℓ)
∗,p+W
(ℓ)
∗,q . This procedure is naturally extendable to merging multiple
I/O-similar neurons. It can be applied repeatedly until all desired neurons are
merged. For the interested reader, the correctness proof and further technical
details are made available in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 (Sanity Check). If for neurons p and q, for all considered
inputs x ∈ X to the network D, zp = zq, then the network D˜ produced as
described above, in which p and q are merged by removing q and letting p serve
as their representative, and by setting W˜
(ℓ)
∗,p = W
(ℓ)
∗,p +W
(ℓ)
∗,q , will have the same
output as D on all inputs x ∈ X. In other words, ∀x ∈ X D(x) = D˜(x).
3.2 Clustering-based Abstraction
In the previous section, we saw that multiple I/O-similar neurons can be merged
to obtain an abstract network behaving similar to the original network. However,
the quality of the abstraction depends on the choice of neurons used in the
merging. Moreover, it might be beneficial to have multiple groups of neurons
that are merged separately. While multiple strategies can be used to identify
such groups, in this section, we illustrate this on one of them — the unsupervised
learning approach of k-means clustering [Bis06], as a proof-of-concept.
Algorithm 1 describes how the approach works in general. It takes as input
the original (trained) network D, an input set X and a function KL, which for
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to identify the clusters
1: procedure Identify-clusters(D,X,α)
2: D˜ ← D
3: for ℓ← 2, ..., L− 1 do ⊲ Loops through the layers
4: if accuracy(D˜) > α then
5: KL(ℓ)← BinarySearch(D˜, α, ℓ) ⊲ Finds optimal number of clusters
6: D˜ ← Abstract(D˜, X,KL)
7: return KL
each layer gives the number of clusters to be identified in that layer. Each x ∈ X
is input into D˜ and for each neuron i in layer ℓ, an |X |-dimensional vector of
observed activations a
(ℓ)
i = [z
(ℓ)
i (x1), . . . , z
(ℓ)
i (x|X|)] is constructed. These vectors
of activations, one for each neuron, are collected in the set A. We can now use
the k-means algorithm on the set A to identify KL(ℓ) clusters. Intuitively, k-
means aims to split the set A into KL(ℓ) clusters such that the pairwise squared
deviations of points in the same cluster is minimized. Once a layer is clustered,
the neurons of each cluster are merged and the neuron closest to the centroid
of the respective cluster, denoted by rep(C) in the pseudocode, is picked as the
cluster representative. As described in Section 3.1, the outgoing connections of
all the neurons in a cluster are added to the representative neuron of the cluster
and all neurons except the representative are deleted.
While Algorithm 1 describes the clustering procedure, it is still a challenge
to find the right KL. In Algorithm 2, we present one heuristic to identify a good
set of parameters for the clustering. It is based on the intuition that merging
neurons closer to the output layer impacts the network accuracy the least, as the
error due to merging is not multiplied and propagated through multiple layers.
The overarching idea is to search for the best k-means parameter, KL(ℓ), for
each layer ℓ starting from the first hidden layer to the last hidden layer, while
making sure that the merging with the said parameter (KL) does not drop the
accuracy of the network beyond a threshold α.
The algorithm takes a trained network D as input along with an input set
X and a parameter α, the lower bound on the accuracy of the abstract network.
The first hidden layer (ℓ = 2) is picked first and k-means clustering is attempted
on it. The parameter KL(ℓ) is discovered using the BinarySearch procedure
which searches for the lowest k such that the accuracy of the network abstracted
with this parameter is the highest. We make a reasonable assumption here that
a higher degree of clustering (i.e. a small k) leads to a higher drop in accuracy.
Note that this might cause the BinarySearch procedure to work on a monotone
space and we might not exactly get the optimal. However, in our experiments,
the binary search turned out to be a sufficiently good alternative to brute-force
search. The algorithm ensures that merging the clusters as prescribed by KL
does not drop the accuracy of the abstracted network below α.3 This process is
3 Naturally, the parameter α has to be less than or equal to the accuracy of D
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now repeated on D˜ starting with the next hidden layer. Finally, KL is returned,
ready to be used with Algorithm 1.
Now we present two results which bound the error induced in the network
due to abstraction. The first theorem applies to the case where we have clustered
groups of I/O-similar neurons in each layer for the set X of network inputs.
Let for each neuron i, ai = [zi(x1), . . . , zi(xN )] where xj ∈ X , and let D˜ =
Abstract(D,X,KL) for some given KL. Define ǫ
(ℓ), the maximal distance of
a neuron from the respective cluster representative, as
ǫ(ℓ) = [ǫ
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(ℓ)
nℓ
]⊺ where ǫ
(ℓ)
i = ‖ai − arCi ‖ (3)
where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm operator,Ci denotes the cluster containing
i and rCi denotes the representative of cluster Ci. Further, define the absolute
error due to abstraction in layer ℓ as err(ℓ) = z˜(ℓ) − z(ℓ).
Theorem 1 (Clustering-induced error). If the accumulated absolute error
in the activations of layer ℓ is given by err(ℓ) and ǫ(ℓ+1) denotes the the maximal
distance of each neuron from their cluster representative (as defined in Eqn. 3)
of layer ℓ + 1, then the absolute error err(ℓ+1) for all inputs x ∈ X can be
bounded by
|err(ℓ+1)| ≤ |W (ℓ)err(ℓ)|+ ǫ(ℓ+1)
and hence, the absolute error in the network output is given by err(L).
The second result considers the local robustness setting where we are inter-
ested in the output of the abstracted network when the input x ∈ X is perturbed
by δ ∈ R|x|.
Theorem 2. If the inputs x ∈ X to the abstract network D˜ are perturbed by
δ ∈ R|x|, then the absolute error in the network output due to both abstraction
and perturbation denoted by errtotal is bounded for every x ∈ X and is given by
|errtotal| ≤ |W˜
(L) . . . W˜ (1)δ|+ |err(L)|
where W˜ (ℓ) is the matrix of weights from layer ℓ to ℓ+ 1 in D˜, L is the number
of layers in D˜ and err(L) is the accumulated error due to abstraction as given
by Theorem 1.
In other words, these theorems allow us to compute the absolute error pro-
duced due to the abstraction alone; or due to both (i) abstraction and (ii) per-
turbation of input. Theorem 2 gives us a direct (but na¨ıve) procedure to perform
local robustness verification by checking if there exists an output neuron i with a
lower bound (D˜i(x)−(Etotal)i) greater than the upper bound (D˜j(x)+(Etotal)j)
of all other output neurons j. The proofs of both theorems can be found in Ap-
pendix A.2.
DeepAbstract: Neural Network Abstraction for Accelerating Verification 9
4 Lifting guarantees from abstract NN to original NN
In the previous section, we discussed how a large neural network could be ab-
stracted and how the absolute error on the output could be calculated and even
used for robustness verification. However, the error bounds presented in Theo-
rem 2 might be too coarse to give any meaningful guarantees. In this section,
we present a proof-of-concept approach for lifting verification results from the
abstracted network to the original network. While in general the lifting depends
on the verification algorithm, as a demonstrative example, we show how to per-
form the lifting when using the verification algorithm DeepPoly [Sin+19a] and
also how it can be used in conjunction with our abstraction technique to give
robustness guarantees on the original network.
We now give a quick summary of DeepPoly. Assume that we need to verify
that the networkD labels all inputs in the δ-neighborhood of a given input x ∈ X
to the same class; in other words, check if D is locally robust for the robustness
query (D,x, δ). DeepPoly functions by propagating the interval [x − δ,x + δ]
through the network with the help of abstract interpretation, producing over-
approximations (a lower and an upper bound) of activations of each neuron.
The robustness query is then answered by checking if the lower bound of the
neuron representing one of the labels is greater than the upper bounds of all
other neurons. We refer the interested reader to [Sin+19a, Section 2] for an
overview of DeepPoly. Note that the algorithm is sound but not complete.
If DeepPoly returns the bounds l˜ and u˜ for the abstract network D˜, the
following theorem allows us to compute [lˆ, uˆ] such that [lˆ, uˆ] ⊇ [l, u], where [l, u]
would have been the bounds returned by DeepPoly on the original network D.
Theorem 3 (Lifting guarantees). Consider the abstraction D˜ obtained by
applying Algorithm 1 on a ReLU feedforward network D. Let l˜(ℓ) and u˜(ℓ) denote
the lower bound and upper bound vectors returned by DeepPoly for the layer ℓ,
and let W˜
(ℓ)
+ = max(0, W˜
(ℓ)) and W˜
(ℓ)
− = min(W˜
(ℓ), 0) denote the +ve and -ve
entries respectively of its ℓth layer weight matrix. Let ǫ(ℓ) denote the vector of
maximal distances of neurons from their cluster representatives (as defined in
Equation 3), and let x be the input we are trying to verify for a perturbation
[−δ, δ]. Then for all layers ℓ < L, we can compute
uˆ(ℓ) = max
(
0,
W˜
(ℓ−1)
+ (uˆ
(ℓ−1) + ǫ(ℓ−1))
+ W˜
(ℓ−1)
− (lˆ
(ℓ−1) − ǫ(ℓ−1))
+ b˜(ℓ)
)
lˆ(ℓ) = max
(
0,
W˜
(ℓ−1)
+ (lˆ
(ℓ−1) − ǫ(ℓ−1))
+ W˜
(ℓ−1)
− (uˆ
(ℓ−1) + ǫ(ℓ−1))
+ b˜(ℓ)
)
where uˆ(1) = u˜(1) = u(1) = x+ δ and lˆ(1) = l˜(1) = l(1) = x− δ such that
[lˆ, uˆ] ⊇ [l, u]
where [l, u] is the bound computed by DeepPoly on the original network.
For output layer ℓ = L, the application of the max(0, ·)-function is omitted,
the rest remains the same.
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In other words, this theorem allows us to compute an over-approximation of
the bounds computed by DeepPoly on the original network D by using only the
abstract network, thereby allowing a local robustness proof to be lifted from the
abstraction to the original network. Note that while this procedure is sound, it is
not complete since the bounds computed by Theorem 3 might still be too coarse.
An empirical discussion is presented in Section 5, an example of the proof lifting
can be seen in Appendix A.5, and the proof is given in Appendix A.3.
5 Experiments
We now analyze the potential of our abstraction. In particular, in Section 5.1, we
look at how much we can abstract while still guaranteeing a high test accuracy for
the abstracted network. Moreover, we present verification results of abstracted
network, suggesting a use case where it replaces the original network. In Section
5.2, we additionally consider lifting of the verification proof from the abstracted
network to the original network.
We ran experiments with multiple neural network architectures on the popu-
lar MNIST dataset [LeC98]. We refer to our network architectures by the short-
hand L× n, for example “6× 100”, to denote a network with L fully-connected
feedforward hidden layers with n neurons each, along with a separate input and
output layers whose sizes depend on the dataset — 784 neurons in the input
layer and 10 in the output layer in the case of MNIST. Interested readers may
find details about the implementation in Appendix A.6.
Remark on Acas Xu We do not run experiments on the standard NN verification
case study Acas Xu [JKO18]. The Acas Xu networks are very compact, contain-
ing only 6 layers with 50 neurons each. The training/test data for these networks
are not easily available, which makes it difficult to run our data-dependent ab-
straction algorithm. Further, the network architecture cannot be scaled up to
observe the benefits of abstraction, which, we conjecture, become evident only
for large networks possibly containing redundancies. Moreover, the specifications
that are commonly verified on Acas Xu are not easily encodable in DeepPoly.
5.1 Abstraction results
First, we generated various NN architectures by scaling up the number of neurons
per layer as well as the number of layers themselves and trained them on MNIST.
More information on the training process is available in Appendix A.4. Then,
we executed our clustering-based abstraction algorithm (Algorithm 1) on each
trained network allowing for a drop in accuracy on a test dataset of at most 1%.
Size of the abstraction Table 1 gives some information about the quality of the
abstraction - the extent to which we can abstract while sacrificing accuracy of
at most 1%. We can see that increasing the width of a layer (number of neurons)
while keeping the depth of the network fixed increases the number of neurons
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Table 1: Reduction rate of abstracted neural networks with different architectures
along with the drop in accuracy (measured on an independent test set). In the
top half, the number of layers (depth) is varied and in the bottom half, the
number of neurons per layer (width) is increased. This table shows that the
clustering-based abstraction works better with wider networks.
Network Accuracy Reduction
Arch. Drop (%) Rate (%)
3× 100 0.40 15.5
4× 100 0.41 15.5
5× 100 0.21 21.2
6× 100 0.10 13.3
6× 50 0.10 5.7
6× 100 0.10 13.3
6× 200 0.10 30.2
6× 300 0.20 39.9
6× 1000 0.01 61.7
that can be merged, i.e. the reduction rate increases. We conjecture that there
is a minimum number of neurons per layer that are needed to simulate the
behavior of the original network. On the other hand, interestingly, if the depth
of the network is increased while keeping the width fixed, the reduction rate
seems to hover around 15-20%.
Figure 2 demonstrates the potential of the clustering-based abstraction pro-
cedure in compressing the network. Here, the abstraction is performed layer
after layer from layer 1 to layer 6. We cluster as much as possible permitting
the test accuracy of the network to drop by at most 1%. Unsurprisingly, we
get more reduction in the later (closer to output) layers compared to the initial.
We conjecture that this happens as the most necessary information is already
processed and computed early on, and the later layers transmit low dimensional
information. Interestingly, one may observe that in layers 4, 5 and 6, all network
architectures ranging from 50 to 500 neurons/layer can be compressed to an
almost equal size around 30 nodes/layer.
Verifying the abstraction As mentioned in the Section 1, we found that the
abstraction, considered as a standalone network, is faster to verify than the
original network. This opens up the possibility of verifying the abstraction and
replacing the original network with it, in real-use scenarios. In Figure 3, we show
the time it takes to verify the abstract network using DeepPoly against the time
taken to verify the respective original network. Note that the reduction rate and
accuracy drop of the corresponding networks can be found in Table 1 above.
Clearly, there is a significant improvement in the run time of the verification
algorithm; for the 6 × 1000 case, the verification algorithm timed out after 1
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Fig. 2: Plot depicting the sizes of the abstract networks when initialized with 4
different architectures and after repetitively applying clustering-based abstrac-
tion on the layers until their accuracy on the test set is approximately 95%.
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Fig. 3: Accelerated verification after abstracting compared to verification of the
original. The abstracted NN are verified directly without performing proof lifting,
as if they were to replace the original one in their application. The time taken
for abstracting (not included in the verification time) is 14, 14, 20, 32, 37, 53,
and 214s respectively.
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Table 2: Results of abstraction, verification and proof lifting of a 6 × 300 NN
on 200 images to verify. The first column gives the number of neurons removed
in layers 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The second column shows the reduction
in the size of the abstracted network compared to the original. We also report
the number of images for which the original network could be proved robust by
lifting the verification proof.
Removed Reduction Images Verification
Neurons Rate (%) Verified Time (min)
15, 25, 100, 100 13.33 195 36
15, 50, 100, 100 14.72 195 36
25, 25, 100, 100 13.89 190 36
25, 50, 100, 100 15.28 190 36
25, 100, 100, 100 18.06 63 35
50, 100, 100, 100 19.44 0 34
hour on the original network while it finished in less than 21 minutes on the
abstract network.
5.2 Results on lifting verification proof
Finally, we ran experiments to demonstrate the working of the full verification
pipeline — involving clustering to identify the neurons that can be merged, per-
forming the abstraction (Section 3.2), running DeepPoly on the abstraction and
finally lifting the verification proof to answer the verification query on original
network (Section 4).
We were interested in two parameters: (i) the time taken to run the full
pipeline; and (ii) the number of verification queries that could be satisfied (out
of 200). We ran experiments on a 6× 300 network that could be verified to be
locally robust for 197/200 images in 48 minutes by DeepPoly. The results are
shown in Table 2. In the best case, our preliminary implementation of the full
pipeline was able to verify robustness for 195 images in 36 minutes — 13s for
clustering and abstracting, 35 min for verification, and 5s for proof lifting. In
other words, a 14.7% reduction in network size produced a 25% reduction in
verification time. When we pushed the abstraction further, e.g. last row of Table
2, to obtain a reduction of 19.4% in the network size, DeepPoly could still verify
robustness of the abstracted network for 196 images in just 34 minutes (29%
reduction). However, in this case, the proof could not be lifted to the original
network as the over-approximations we obtained were too coarse.
This points to the interesting fact that the time taken in clustering and proof
lifting are indeed not the bottlenecks in the pipeline. Moreover, a decrease in the
width of the network indeed tends to reduce the verification time. This opens
the possibility of spending additional computational time exploring more power-
ful heuristics (e.g. principal component analysis) in place of the na¨ıve k-means
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clustering in order to find smaller abstractions. Moreover, a counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) approach can be employed to improve
the proof lifting by tuning the abstraction where necessary.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an abstraction framework for feed-forward neural networks
using ReLU activation units. Rather than just syntactic information, it reflects
the semantics of the neurons, via our concept of I/O-similarity on experimental
values. In contrast to compression-based frameworks, the abstraction mapping
between the original neurons and the abstract neurons allows for transferring ver-
ification proofs (transferring counterexamples is trivial), allowing for abstraction-
based verification of neural networks.
While we have demonstrated the potential of the new abstraction approach
by a proof-of-concept implementation, its practical applicability relies on sev-
eral next steps. Firstly, I/O-similarity with the Euclidean distance ignores even
any linear dependencies of the I/O-vectors; I/O-similarity with e.g. principal
component analysis thus might yield orders of magnitude smaller abstractions,
scaling to more realistic networks. Secondly, due to the correspondence between
the proofs, CEGAR could be employed: one can refine those neurons where the
transferred constraints in the proof become too loose. Besides, it is also desir-
able to extend the framework to other architectures, such as convolutional neural
networks.
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A Technical Details and Proofs
A.1 Correctness of merging
Suppose for every input, the activation values of two neurons p and q of layer
ℓ are equal, i.e. z
(ℓ)
p = z
(ℓ)
q (note that for the sake of readability, we omit the
input from our equations and write z
(ℓ)
i instead of z
(ℓ)
i (x)), then we argue that the
neurons could be merged by keeping, without loss of generality, only neuron p and
setting the outgoing weights of p to the sum of outgoing weights of p and q. More
formally, suppose the activation value of neuron p, z
(ℓ)
p = φ(W
(ℓ−1)
p,∗ z
(ℓ−1) + bℓp),
and that of neuron q, z
(ℓ)
q = φ(W
(ℓ−1)
q,∗ z
(ℓ−1) + bℓq) are equal for every input to
the network. Let D˜ be the neural network obtained after merging neurons p and
q in layer ℓ. Note that D and D˜ are identical in all layers which follow layer
ℓ. Due to the feedforward nature of the networks, it is easy to see that if for
each input the vector of pre-activations of layer ℓ + 1 in D and D˜ are same, i.e.
h˜(ℓ+1) = h(ℓ+1), then the outputs of D and D˜ will also be the same.
The weight matrices of D are copied to D˜. W˜ (ℓ−1) is set to W (ℓ−1) with the
qth row deleted. Further, we set W˜
(ℓ)
∗,p = W
(ℓ)
∗,p +W
(ℓ)
∗,q . Intuitively, this is same
as deleting neuron q and moving all its outgoing edges to neuron p. Suppose the
pre-activation value of neuron i of layer ℓ+ 1 of D was given by
h
(ℓ+1)
i = b
(ℓ+1)
i + w
(ℓ)
i,pz
(ℓ)
p + w
(ℓ)
i,q z
(ℓ)
q +
∑
k∈{1,...,nℓ}\{p,q}
w
(ℓ)
i,kz
(ℓ)
k
Since we assume that z
(l)
p = z
(l)
q , we can rewrite the RHS of the above
equation as
h
(ℓ+1)
i = b
(ℓ+1)
i + (w
(ℓ)
i,p + w
(ℓ)
i,q )z
(ℓ)
p +
∑
k∈{1,...,nℓ}\{p,q}
w
(ℓ)
i,kz
(ℓ)
k
In the transformed NN D˜, since we have set W˜
(ℓ)
∗,p =W
(ℓ)
∗,p +W
(ℓ)
∗,q , we obtain
h˜
(ℓ+1)
i = b
(ℓ+1)
i + (w
(ℓ)
i,p + w
(ℓ)
i,q )z
(ℓ)
p +
∑
k∈{1,...,nℓ}\{p,q}
w
(ℓ)
i,kz
(ℓ)
k
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A.2 Error bounds
Let nℓ denote the number of neurons in layer ℓ. We use the symbol z
(ℓ) =
[z
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , z
(ℓ)
nℓ ]
⊺ to denote the column vector of activations of layer ℓ,W (ℓ) = (w
(ℓ)
ji )
to denote the nℓ+1 × nℓ matrix of weights w
(ℓ)
ji of the edge from node i in layer
ℓ to node j in layer ℓ + 1, h(ℓ) = [h
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , h
(ℓ)
nℓ ]
⊺ denotes the column vector of
pre-activations of layer ℓ, and b(ℓ) = [b
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , b
(ℓ)
nℓ ]
⊺ to denote the column vector
of biases of layer ℓ.
In the rest of the discussion, we omit the parameter x and write z(ℓ) or h(ℓ)
instead of z(ℓ)(x) or h(ℓ)(x) respectively for the sake of readability.
Lemma 1 (Single-step error). If the activations z(ℓ) of a single layer ℓ are
perturbed by ∆z(ℓ), then the perturbation of the activations of layer ℓ + 1 is
bounded according to
∆z(ℓ+1) ≤ φ(W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ))
if the activation function φ is sub-additive.
Proof (of Lemma 1). Suppose that z(ℓ) was perturbed by some ∆z(ℓ) to obtain
the new activation z˜(ℓ) = z(ℓ) +∆z(ℓ), then we would define
h˜(ℓ+1) =W (ℓ)z˜(ℓ) + b(ℓ+1)
following which, we can bound the difference between the original h(ℓ+1) and
the perturbed h˜(ℓ+1):
∆h(ℓ+1) = h˜(ℓ+1) − h(ℓ+1) =W (ℓ)(z˜(ℓ) − z(ℓ))
=W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ)
When this error is propagated across the neurons of the (ℓ + 1)th layer, we
have
z˜(ℓ+1) = φ(h˜(ℓ+1)) = φ(h(ℓ+1) +∆h(ℓ+1))
= φ(h(ℓ+1) +W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ)) (4)
If φ is sub-additive, we have
z˜(ℓ+1) ≤ φ(h(ℓ+1)) + φ(W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ))
z˜(ℓ+1) ≤ z(ℓ+1) + φ(W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ))
∆z(ℓ+1) ≤ φ(W (ℓ)∆z(ℓ))
⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 1). Assume we already have clustered all layers up to layer
ℓ+1 and we know the accumulated error for layer ℓ, namely err(ℓ). The error in
layer ℓ+1 is defined as err(ℓ+1) = |˜˜z(ℓ+1)−z(ℓ+1)|, where ˜˜z denotes the activation
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values of layer ℓ + 1 after clustering it. Let z˜(ℓ+1) denote the activation values
of layer ℓ + 1 when all layers before are clustered but not the layer itself, and
z(ℓ+1) shall be the original activation values. We have
|err(ℓ+1)| = |˜˜z(ℓ+1) − z(ℓ+1)| (5)
= |˜˜z(ℓ+1) − z˜(ℓ+1) + z˜(ℓ+1) − z(ℓ+1)| (6)
≤ |˜˜z(ℓ+1) − z˜(ℓ+1)|+ |z˜(ℓ+1) − z(ℓ+1)| (7)
We know from Lemma 1 how the error is propagated to the next layer. So,
we know
|z˜(ℓ+1) − z(ℓ+1)| ≤ |φ(W ((ℓ))err(ℓ))| (8)
We now have to consider the error introduced in layer ℓ + 1 by the clustering.
From definition, it is |zri −zi| ≤ ǫri for any node i and its cluster representative
ri. Note that any node is contained in a cluster but that most of the clusters
have size 1. For most nodes, we would then have i = ri. However, in the general
case we get
|˜˜z(ℓ+1) − z˜(ℓ+1)| ≤ ǫ(ℓ+1) (9)
Thus, equation 5 becomes
|err(ℓ+1)| ≤ |φ(W ((ℓ))err(ℓ))|+ ǫ(ℓ+1) (10)
This can be made simpler for the ReLU-, parametric or leaky ReLU and the
tanh-activation function. For all of them, it holds |φ(x)| ≤ |x|. Thus
|err(ℓ+1)| ≤ |W ((ℓ))err(ℓ)|+ ǫ(ℓ+1) (11)
which is what we wanted to show. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 2). We are interested in computing |errtotal| = |D˜(x˜)−D(x)|
which can be rewritten as |D˜(x˜)− D˜(x)) + (D˜(x)−D(x)|.
|D˜(x˜) − D˜(x)| ≤ |W˜ (L) . . . W˜ (1)δ| is a consequence of Lemma 1 and under the
assumption that the activation function φ fulfills φ(x) ≤ x, which is true for
ReLU and tanh.
|D˜(x) −D(x)| = |err(L)| which is a direct consequence of Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
A.3 Lifting guarantees
Proof (of Theorem 3). As the verification of a specific property only considers
the upper and lower bound of the output layer L, it is sufficient to show that
uˆ(L) ≥ u(L) and lˆ(L) ≤ l(L), where u and l correspond to the upper- and lower-
bound given by DeepPoly on the original network, and uˆ(L) and lˆ(L) denote the
over-approximations.
We can show this inductively, where the base case is obvious. For the first layer,
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uˆ(1) = u˜(1) + δuacc(1) = u
(1) + 0 and lˆ(1) = l˜(1) − δlacc(1) = l
(0) − 0.
Let’s consider now some layer ℓ and start with the upper bound. We have
u(ℓ) = max
(
0,W
(ℓ−1)
+ u
(ℓ−1) +W
(ℓ−1)
− l
(ℓ−1) + bℓ
)
(12)
from the calculation of [Sin+19a, Section 4.4] and
uˆ(ℓ) = max
(
0, W˜
(ℓ−1)
+ (uˆ
(ℓ−1) + ǫ(ℓ−1)) + W˜
(ℓ−1)
− (lˆ
(ℓ−1) − ǫ(ℓ−1)) + b˜ℓ
)
(13)
by our definition.
We want to show that uˆ(ℓ) − u(ℓ) ≥ 0. We can leave out the max operation,
because it is clear that (a− b ≥ 0)⇒ (max(0, a)−max(0, b) ≥ 0).
Let’s consider only one node in layer ℓ, say node n, and omit the max-operation.
For simplicity, we also omit the superscript ℓ − 1 in the following calculation.
Let I denote all nodes from layer ℓ − 1 in the original network and I˜ in the
abstracted one. We get
uˆ(ℓ)n − u
(ℓ)
n =
∑
i∈I˜
w˜+i,n(uˆi + ǫi)
+
∑
i∈I˜
w˜−i,n(lˆi − ǫi)
−
(∑
i∈I
w+i,nui +
∑
i∈I
w−i,nli
)
It is I˜ ⊂ I and we can map all nodes in I to their corresponding cluster c with
its cluster-representative r ∈ I˜. Thus we get
uˆ(ℓ)n − u
(ℓ)
n =
∑
c cluster
(
w˜+r,n(uˆr + ǫr)−
∑
m∈c
w+m,num
)
+
∑
c cluster
(
w˜−r,n(lˆr − ǫr)−
∑
m∈c
w−m,nlm
)
For each cluster c, there are two cases: either it contains only one node or more
than one node. In the case of one node per cluster, the abstracted network does
not differ from the original one, so w˜r = wr. For such cluster c, we get
w+r,n(uˆr + ǫr)− w
+
r,nur
=w+r,n(uˆr + ǫr − ur)
=w+r,n(uˆr − ur)
≥ 0
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and
w−r,n(lˆr − ǫr)− w
−
r,nlr
=w−r,n(lˆr − ǫr − lr)
=w−r,n(lˆr − lr)
≥ 0
because for any un-clustered node ǫr = 0, and by induction hypothesis uˆr ≥ ur
and lˆr ≤ lr.
Let’s now consider the second case, where one cluster contains more than
one node. In such cluster c, we have w˜r =
∑
m∈cwm, so
w˜+r,n(uˆr + ǫr)−
∑
m∈c
w+m,num
=
∑
m∈c
w+m,n(uˆr + ǫr)−
∑
m∈c
w+m,num
=
∑
m∈c
w+m,n(uˆr + ǫr − um)
≥ 0
and
w˜−r,n(lˆr − ǫr)−
∑
m∈c
w−m,nlm)
=
∑
m∈c
w−m,n(lˆr − ǫr − lm)
≥ 0
because by definition of ǫr, we have for all m ∈ c: uˆr + ǫr ≥ um and similarly,
lˆr − ǫr ≤ lm. We get that uˆ
(ℓ)
n − u
(ℓ)
n ≥ 0. The calculation for the lower bounds
follows the same principle just with exchanged signs and is thus not presented
here. ⊓⊔
A.4 Details on training process
We generated various NN architectures by scaling up the number of neurons per
layer as well as the number of layers themselves and trained them on MNIST.
For doing so, we split the dataset into three parts: one for the training, one
for validation and one for testing. The training is then performed on the train-
ing dataset by using common optimizers and loss functions. The training was
stopped when the accuracy on the validation set did not increase anymore.
The NN on MNIST were trained on 60000 samples from the whole dataset. Of
these, 10% are split for validation, thus there are 54000 images for the training
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itself and 6000 images for validation. The optimizer used for the training process
is ADAM, which is an extension to the stochastic gradient descent. To prevent
getting stuck in local minima, it includes the first and second moments of the
gradient. It is a common choice for the training of NN and performed reasonably
well in this application. Its parameter are set to the default from TensorFlow,
namely a learning rate of 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and ǫ = 1e− 07.
For MNIST, the most reasonable loss function is the sparse categorical crossen-
tropy. The training process was stopped when the loss function on the validation
data did not decrease anymore. Usually, the process would stop after at most 10
epochs.
A.5 Proof lifting example
z˜1
l˜1 = −1
u˜1 = 1
z˜2
l˜2 = −1
u˜2 = 1
z˜3
0
l˜3 = −2
u˜3 = 2
z˜4
0
l˜4 = −2
u˜4 = 2
z˜5
l˜5 = 0
u˜5 = 2
z˜6
l˜6 = 0
u˜6 = 2
z˜7
0
l˜7 = 0
u˜7 = 4
z˜8
0
z˜9
l˜9 = 0
u˜9 = 4
z˜10
z˜11
5
l˜11 = 5
u˜11 = 13
z˜12
0
l˜12 = 0
u˜12 = 4
1
1
1
-1
max(0, z˜3)
max(0, z˜4)
1
✄1
1
✄1
max(0, z˜7)
max(0, z˜8)
✄1 2
✄0 1
✄1
✄1
Fig. 4: Abstracted network showing the constrains returned by DeepPoly. Note
that this is equivalent to having the ReLU unit identified by neurons 8 and 10
merged into the ReLU unit identified by neurons 7 and 9.
Example 2. Consider the network shown in Figure 4. The ReLU layers have
already been split into two: those (i) computing the affine sum and (ii) computing
max(0, ·). The greyed/striked out weights belong to the original network but are
not present in the abstract network, in which the ReLU unit identified by neurons
8 and 10 have been merged into the ReLU unit identified by neurons 7 and 9.
The two weights coloured purple (between neuron 9 and 11 as well as between
9 and 12) are a result of abstraction, as described in Section 3.1.
We apply the DeepPoly algorithm as discussed in [Sin+19a, Section 2] on
the abstracted network to obtain the bounds shown in the figure. Neurons 1-7
and 9 are unaffected by the merging procedure. For neuron 11, we have l˜11 = 5
and u˜11 = 13, and for neuron 12, l˜12 = 0 and u˜12 = 4. Since l˜11 > u˜12, we
22 P. Ashok et al.
can conclude that the abstracted network is robust, however, we do not know if
the lower bound l11 from the original network is indeed greater than the upper
bound u12.
Using Theorem 3 and the result of DeepPoly on the abstraction, we can
compute the bounds [lˆ, uˆ] such that it contains [l, u], the bounds that would
have been computed by DeepPoly for the original network.
lˆ(6) ≤ l(6)
or
[
lˆ11
lˆ12
]
≤
[
l11
l12
]
and
uˆ(6) ≥ u(6)
or
[
uˆ11
uˆ12
]
≥
[
u11
u12
]
Assuming the cluster diameter to be ǫ as defined in Equation 3, we get
uˆ(6) =
[
13 + 2ǫ(4)
4 + ǫ(4)
]
and
lˆ(6) =
[
5− 2ǫ(4)
−ǫ(4)
]
and therefore, [
5− 2ǫ(4)
−ǫ(4)
]
≤
[
l11
l12
]
and
[
u11
u12
]
≤
[
13 + 2ǫ(4)
4 + ǫ(4)
]
To determine if t 5− 2ǫ(4) = lˆ11 > uˆ12 = 4+ ǫ
(4) holds, we need to have a value
for ǫ(4). As this is only a toy example and the neurons were chosen manually and
not by clustering, we do not have a value for it here. However, one can see that
the proof lifting heavily depends on this value. If it was ǫ(4) ≥ 13 , the property
could not be lifted, even it would theoretically hold on the original network.
A.6 Implementation details
We implemented the abstraction technique described in Section 3.2 using the
popular deep learning library TensorFlow [Aba+15] and the machine learning
library Scikit-learn [Ped+11]. For the verification, we used the DeepPoly imple-
mentation available in the ERAN toolbox4
4 Available at github.com/eth-sri/ERAN
